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PRIVATE POLICING AND THE STATE’S 
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ABSTRACT 
  This Note argues that a variety of “private police” forces, such as 
university patrols and residential security guards, should be held to 
the constitutional limitations found in the Bill of Rights. These private 
police act as arms of the state by supplying force in response to a 
public demand for order and security. The state, as sovereign, retains 
responsibility to allocate force, in the form of either public or private 
police, in response to public demand. This state responsibility—a 
facet of its police power—is evidenced throughout English and 
American history. When this force responds to a public demand for 
order and security, existing state action doctrine case law places both 
public and private force under constitutional scrutiny. 
INTRODUCTION 
Policing in modern America has become a tangled web of what 
are typically referred to as public and private police forces.1 By the 
end of the twentieth century, public-private police partnerships 
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 1. At a basic level, the distinction between public and private police is one of funding: 
public police are funded directly by the state, while private police are funded directly by private 
organizations. See infra Table 1: Models of Police Authority and Part I.B. A university patrol 
paid by a private university would be a private police force. For additional examples of private 
police, see infra note 3. 
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included joint investigations, information sharing, and cooperative 
urban renovation initiatives.2 Disneyland, shopping malls, university 
campuses, residential neighborhoods, and many corporations rely on 
private police forces.3 Since September 11, 2001, private police have 
taken on increasingly important roles that were unanticipated even in 
the early 1990s.4 
Both domestically and internationally, accusations of civil 
liberties violations and human rights abuses sometimes accompany 
private police activities. Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq employed private 
police.5 The United States indicted five Blackwater security guards in 
2008 for the shooting deaths of fourteen Iraqi civilians.6 Campus 
police accused of racial profiling at Yale and Harvard universities 
have denied Freedom of Information Act requests for personnel 
records, arguing that public disclosure requirements do not apply to 
“private” entities.7 
The state’s power and responsibility to allocate force in response 
to its needs (namely, the need for order and security) can benefit but 
can also threaten individuals’ liberty and freedom. The United States 
Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, serves to limit federal and state government by, among 
 
 2. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357, 380–84 (2006); see also L. Johnston, Private Policing: Uniformity 
and Diversity, in POLICING ACROSS THE WORLD 226, 234 (R.I. Mawby ed., 1999) (“Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs) have been set up to facilitate co-operation between public police 
and commercial security companies in the resuscitation of urban areas.”). 
 3. See, e.g., B. Loveday, Government and Accountability of the Police, in POLICING 
ACROSS THE WORLD, supra note 2, at 132, 143 (“Some [American] townships have privatized 
their local police service entirely.”); Joh, supra note 2, at 358 (listing “Disneyland, Abu Ghraib 
U.S. military prison, [and] the Mall of America” among the places employing private police); 
Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 919 (2007) (“Today, the 
so-called ‘private police’ are everywhere: conducting residential security patrols; monitoring 
shoppers in department stores; safeguarding warehouses; patrolling college campuses and 
shopping malls; and guarding factories, casinos, office parks, schools and parking lots.”). 
 4. Joh, supra note 2, at 388; see also JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE 
IN AMERICA 42–43 (2003) (comparing 1990 data on private policing with post-9/11 estimates). 
 5. Joh, supra note 2, at 358. 
 6. The incident occurred in Iraq on September 16, 2007. Del Quentin Wilber, Contractors 
Charged in ’07 Iraq Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at A2. 
 7. In 2006, the Harvard Crimson lost its lawsuit to force the Harvard police to disclose 
their records. Nadya Labi, Lux et Privacy, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 49; see also 
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 840 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Mass. 
2006) (“[P]ublic records law . . . [is] applicable to documents held by public entities, not private 
ones.”). In 2008, however, the Freedom of Information Commission ruled against the Yale 
Police Department. Labi, supra, at 49. 
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other things, countering some of the negative aspects of the state’s 
allocation of force.8 But, as the Supreme Court has observed, these 
constitutional amendments restrain only government action, that is, 
the public supply of force.9 Yet throughout history and into today, 
states have relied on a mix of public and private organizations to 
supply force in response to the public demand for security and order 
in the community. The state action doctrine, as espoused by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, maps poorly onto this mix of public and private 
supply. 
This Note seeks to bring clarity to the Court’s confused state 
action doctrine10 by reconceptualizing the distinction between public 
and private police forces. Part I begins by arguing that the underlying 
legitimizing authority for the use of force is, and has always been, the 
state. Part I conceptualizes legitimate force11 along two dimensions, 
namely, public-private and supply-demand, and identifies four models 
of policing authority (Table 1). Deriving authority from its populace, 
the state’s exclusive police powers represent its obligation to allocate 
the supply of public or private force in response to the demands of its 
citizens for order and security. Private demand for force, which this 
Note considers demand for force unrelated to communal needs for 
order and security, also exists, but is outside the state’s obligation.12 
 
 8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10–16 (delimiting the military powers of Congress); 
id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing for the writ of habeas corpus); id. art. II, § 4 (allowing for 
impeachment of executive officers); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring jury trials in criminal cases); 
id. art. III, § 3 (limiting the crime of treason); id. amend. IV (limiting searches and seizures); id. 
amend. V (requiring due process); id. amend. VI (requiring certain criminal procedures). 
 9. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (noting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies exclusively to state action). 
 10. For direct critiques of the state action doctrine, see infra notes 147–48. 
 11. In the context of this Note, legitimate force is understood simply as force within the 
boundaries of established tradition or law. Legitimate does not equal constitutional. Compare 
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high that he is 
above the law.”), with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled on other grounds by 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“‘[U]nder color of’ enumerated state 
authority excludes acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority under state law, 
state custom, or state usage to do what he did.”). 
 12. See infra Part I.B; infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1.  Models of Policing Authority 
Supply of Force  
Public Private 
Public Official Police Arms of the State Demand for 
Force 
Private Official Mercenaries Private Mercenaries 
Parts II and III demonstrate the evolution of the state’s derived 
authority through a historical analysis of policing in England and 
America, respectively. Part II emphasizes the shifting allocation of 
public and private supplies of force over time and the consistent 
exclusive sovereign responsibility to maintain peace and security. Part 
III details how the American Revolution and the U.S. Constitution 
shifted the American conception of government to one of popular 
sovereignty while retaining traditional English notions of policing. 
Part III also introduces the public-private distinction in policing that 
became prevalent after the establishment of modern, professional 
police departments. 
Part IV applies these four models of police authority in order to 
reconceptualize the state action doctrine. The proposed categories in 
Table 1 build upon accepted notions of state action. Public suppliers 
of force—under the “official police model” and the “official 
mercenaries model”—are either government-employed police 
officers acting in an official capacity or otherwise operating under 
color of law under traditional state action doctrine.13 Because the 
state cannot waive its police power responsibility, legitimate 
responses to public demand for force are attributable, explicitly or 
implicitly, to the state. A response explicitly attributable to the state 
reveals the responder to be part of the official police model. A 
response implicitly attributable to the state falls within the “arm of 
the state model.”14 For example, business owners in an East Los 
Angeles neighborhood hired a private security patrol in response to 
burglaries, graffiti, and an inadequate police response.15 The private 
security patrol’s response to a public demand for order and security 
places the patrol within the arm of the state model. Crucially, 
individuals operating within the arm of the state model should be 
 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. Simmons, supra note 3, at 920. 
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liable for constitutional violations. Only the fourth category—
“private mercenaries”—should be outside the reach of the 
Constitution because only these private mercenaries act outside the 
scope of the state’s police power responsibility.16 
I.  THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE STATE’S USE OF FORCE 
In its role as sovereign, the state retains the ultimate 
responsibility and obligation to allocate force to ensure order and 
security.17 The state chooses some combination of public and private 
entities to supply this force, legitimizing these entities through laws 
and customs. This combination of public and private, supply and 
demand, results in four basic models of policing authority: official 
police, official mercenaries, arms of the state, and private 
mercenaries.18 The Bill of Rights should constrain not only official 
state entities but also arms of the state because, although the state can 
allocate force, it cannot relinquish its responsibility. 
A.  The State’s Monopoly on Allocation of Legitimate Force 
Under one influential theory of the state—which was of 
particular importance in American Revolutionary theory19—the state 
is endowed with certain responsibilities that, by their collective 
nature, cannot be left solely to the individual.20 Primary among these 
responsibilities is the maintenance of security and order.21 When 
 
 16. See infra Part IV.C. 
 17. Other competing theories of the state exist, but they are well outside the scope of this 
Note. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE 
COURSE OF HISTORY 6 (2002) (“States may be militaristic, legalistic, and traditional to varying 
degrees . . . .”). 
 18. See supra Table 1: Models of Policing Authority. 
 19. See, e.g., NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, BY A CITIZEN OF AMERICA (1787), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL 
FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 110, 131 (David Wootton ed., 2003) (“In a free 
government . . . the whole society engages to protect each individual.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (“When one becomes a member of 
society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected 
by his relations to others, he might retain. . . . This is the very essence of government . . . .”); 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 116 (Marshall Missner ed., 2008) (1651) (describing the 
establishment of the commonwealth as necessary to the preservation and contentedness of 
man). 
 21. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 3 (Forgotten Books 2008) (1776) 
(“[S]ecurity being the true design and end of government . . . .”). 
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individuals leave the state of nature,22 the state assumes collective 
responsibility for their security demands.23 As such, the state’s 
existence and the security of its people necessarily depend on the 
state’s ability to govern—specifically, to allocate force.24 
By definition, the state monopolizes “legitimate coercion” in a 
civilization.25 Legitimacy derives from popular authority: sovereigns 
must obtain explicit or implicit consent from their subjects.26 A state 
may gain authority through the effective use of elections, fear, 
religion, or custom.27 Popular authority is closely related to and 
influenced by force, but they are not equivalent.28 “In a system of 
political belief that takes popular sovereignty as its first principle, the 
rule of law must appear to represent the people: law is authoritative 
because it is representative.”29 
A long-standing and often unquestioned truism is that the 
Hobbesian state of nature30 leads to the conclusion that “[t]he state 
has, must have, or should have a monopoly of force.”31 In historical 
 
 22. See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 883–85 (2004) (illustrating the basic 
state-of-nature story). 
 23. See Ian Loader & Neil Walker, Necessary Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in 
the Production of Security, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 
165, 185 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., 2006) (“[S]ecurity is a constant foundational 
presence as the most basic instrument in the realization of . . . freedom.”). 
 24. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 2 (2006). 
 25. LES JOHNSTON, THE REBIRTH OF PRIVATE POLICING 218 (1992) (emphasis added); see 
also PASTOR, supra note 4, at 40 (“The legitimacy of government, particularly regarding the use 
of force and of powers of arrest, had a deep-seated historical premise.”). 
 26. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 532 (1985). 
 27. See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 213 (“Different constitutional orders are 
responsive to different demands for legitimacy.”); HOBBES, supra note 20, at 128 (distinguishing 
between three types of commonwealths: democracy, monarchy, and aristocracy, all of which 
derive authority from the populace); NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 103 (Leo Paul S. de 
Alvarez trans., 1980) (1532) (“[S]ince men love at their own pleasure and fear at the prince’s 
pleasure, a wise prince should found himself on that which is his, not on that which is dependent 
on others . . . .”). 
 28. See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 6 (suggesting that “[h]istory, strategy, and law” 
legitimize military force and “make possible legitimate governing institutions”). 
 29. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 23 (1997). 
 30. “[I]f there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will 
and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.” HOBBES, 
supra note 20, at 116. 
 31. Rosky, supra note 22, at 885; see also, e.g., JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 24 (“[I]t has 
generally been assumed that policing is an inherently public good, whose provision has to reside 
in the hands of a single, monopoly supplier, the state.”). 
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practice, however, public versus private distinctions and a variety of 
state compositions complicate this monopoly thesis.32 
The monopoly thesis, problematically, conflates the supply of 
force with the allocation of force.  This Note, in contrast, distinguishes 
these terms.33 The state responds to the demand for order and security 
in a community by allocating the supply of force to meet that demand. 
This response can be an explicit construction of policing institutions 
or an implicit acceptance of policing customs and norms. 
Take a state where the market privately supplies all force: 
military, punishment, and policing force.34 The state allocates force 
through private channels, but ultimately remains a state: 
“[b]oundaries are defended; allies are protected; wars are fought. 
Suspects are found and caught. Criminals are imprisoned . . . .”35 But 
how can the state ensure that it will not be violently overthrown if its 
military is privately run?36 This issue typically triggers the monopoly 
thesis: suggesting that this supply of force must be made public to 
ensure the state’s continuing existence.37 
But moving to a state with a public military—a public supply of 
force—changes little. Public military complexes are just as capable of 
violent overthrow as private military industries.38 With either public 
or private supplies of force, the state requires a “culture of loyalty”: a 
“set of beliefs, symbols and rituals” to discourage violent overthrow 
 
 32. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 918, 921–24 (recognizing that state exclusivity of criminal 
justice services “is . . . anomalous when compared to the provision of criminal justice services 
over the past one thousand years”). 
 33. Cf. Rosky, supra note 22, at 914–17 & fig.1 (laying out the possible quadrants stemming 
from the public-private and supply-demand dimensions of force); id. at 921–22 (defining how 
exercise and allocation relate to supply and demand of force, respectively). 
 34. This example borrows heavily from Rosky’s “ultraminimal state” thought experiment. 
See id. at 978–80 (describing the thought experiment). Nozick imagines a similar scenario in 
which a single “dominant protection agency” is transformed into an ultraminimal state through 
enforcement of its monopoly rights. JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 32 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 15–17 (1974)). 
 35. Rosky, supra note 22, at 979. 
 36. See id. at 979–80 (positing that a private military industry would quickly lead to the 
subversion and overthrow of the state because the private industry controls force); see also 
MACHIAVELLI, supra note 27, at 112 (“[A] prince ought to have two fears: one fear arises from 
within and concerns his subjects; the other arises from without and concerns external powers.”). 
 37. See Rosky, supra note 22, at 890 (“On its face, the monopoly thesis seems to suggest 
that punishment, policing, and military institutions must be ‘public’ . . . .”). 
 38. See id. at 982 (recognizing that, in the case of both public and private supply of military, 
“the relevant players are roughly the same”). 
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through the establishment of “duty.”39 Because either scenario—
public or private supply of force—results in a (precariously formed) 
state, the public supply of force cannot, by definition, be an essential 
characteristic of a state.40 Rather, the state’s allocation of force is the 
essential characteristic. 
B. Models of Policing Authority 
Table 1 presents four models of policing authority. Two of these 
models—official police and arms of the state—can fulfill a public 
demand for security and order.41 The other two models—official 
mercenaries and private mercenaries—can fulfill a private demand 
for force. Official police and official mercenaries are public suppliers 
of force. Arms of the state and private mercenaries are private 
suppliers of force. The state decides how to allocate force among the 
four models through law, custom, and direct action. 
Severity, breadth, and speed outline the practical limits of the 
public supply of force.42 At some point, the state allows individuals to 
supply their own force—for example, when self-defense becomes 
necessary—because public supply at that point is impractical, slow, or 
inefficient.43 The point at which this public-private supply distinction 
is drawn varies depending on a state’s particular circumstances, but 
the state still allocates police and punishment through legal rules even 
in the case of self-defense. 
Public and private demand for force lie on opposite ends of a 
continuum, making fine distinctions difficult to discern. A corporation 
or other private organization sometimes supplies force based on the 
need for force and community security (a public demand) and 
sometimes supplies force based on other market concerns (a private 
 
 39. Id. at 984, 985–87; see also MACHIAVELLI, supra note 27, at 126 (claiming that a prince 
always arms his subjects to shift distrust to loyalty and faithfulness). 
 40. See, e.g., Adam Crawford, Policing and Security as ‘Club Goods’: The New Enclosures?, 
in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 23, at 111, 111 (“It 
has become generally accepted that governments alone no longer determine (if they ever fully 
did) what sort of security is needed by, nor are they the sole providers of policing on behalf of, 
the populations they govern.”). 
 41. See supra Table 1: Models of Policing Authority. 
 42. Cf. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 451 
(2008) (evaluating self-defense in light of “the structure and practicalities of law making”); 
Rosky, supra note 22, at 1021–23 (arguing that speed, severity, and breadth all contribute to the 
justification for self-defense and self-help). 
 43. See Rosky, supra note 22, at 1021 (“Every liberal definition of self-defense refers . . . to 
‘imminent’ harms.”). 
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demand). For example, a bank security guard whose sole function is 
to guard a bank vault from thieves fulfills a private demand for force 
and thereby acts under the private mercenary model. The demand 
that the security guard fulfills is private precisely because the guard 
would choose not to intervene to prevent altercations or crimes 
unrelated to the security of the vault. Intervening in an unrelated 
crime would answer to a communal interest in order and security and 
would detract from the guard’s primary mission to protect the vault. 
A private university patrolman is more likely to fulfill a public 
demand for order and security, in part because his job responsibilities 
are more generalized and in part because he must regularly interact 
with the general public. The private university patrolman thus 
generally acts under the arms of the state model. 
Ostensibly, the state allocates all legitimate uses of force.44 But 
the state bears a special responsibility for preventing crime and 
maintaining domestic order, which this Note refers to as the public 
demand for security and order.45 “[G]overnments will inevitably 
remain central to crime prevention in modern societies . . . because 
the state cannot renounce the responsibility. The maintenance of 
domestic order is as crucial to the legitimacy of government as 
defence against external enemies.”46 The Bill of Rights tracks this 
responsibility mainly by imposing restrictions on the means by which 
the state enforces order and security.47 
C.  Applicability of Constitutional Restrictions to Models of Policing 
Authority 
Under the state action doctrine, the Bill of Rights applies to 
official police.48 Official mercenaries also fall under constitutional 
restrictions, because the state action doctrine is often preoccupied 
with determining whether the state acted through its official proxies: 
 
 44. See supra Part I.A. The extent to which the state practically controls the use of force in 
society is the source of some debate. See, e.g., supra note 40. 
 45. In addition to order and security, punishment and military force are the other two 
aspects of the public demand of force. See Rosky, supra note 22, at 896–912 (delineating the 
three aspects of force). These two aspects, however, are beyond the primary focus of this Note. 
 46. Monique Marks & Andrew Goldsmith, The State, the People and Democratic Policing: 
The Case of South Africa, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, 
supra note 23, at 139, 150 (quoting D. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 144 (1994)). 
 47. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (restricting searches and seizures); id. amend. V 
(requiring due process). 
 48. See infra Part IV.A. 
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its employees. To say, however, that the state action doctrine enforces 
constitutional restrictions on only public suppliers of force is a 
convenient shorthand, but it is misleading and inaccurate. 
To fulfill its citizens’ public demands for force, the state can and 
does utilize private suppliers, such as private police forces, which 
represent the arms of the state model. Regardless of whether the 
private supply of force is followed by eventual state intervention, the 
private supply of force to fulfill a public demand should fall under 
constitutional auspices. “Whether termed ‘traditional,’ ‘exclusive,’ or 
‘significant,’ . . . . the State’s delegation of that power to a private 
party is, accordingly, subject to due process scrutiny.”49 
The state action doctrine should therefore focus not on the 
actor’s status (official or private) but on the actor’s function. Because 
the state cannot abdicate its responsibility for the allocation of 
legitimate force,50 whenever private police act either explicitly or 
implicitly as suppliers (arms of the state) to fulfill this public demand 
for force, the Bill of Rights should apply to those private police 
actions. When private police act as suppliers to fulfill some other 
private demand for force (private mercenaries), however, the Bill of 
Rights should not apply. 
Private police action thus breaks down into three relevant 
categories. First, some private police may be explicitly transformed 
into public suppliers answerable to the Bill of Rights: they become de 
facto official police.51 Second, the private police may be seen as 
fulfilling a public demand for force and thus are again answerable to 
the Bill of Rights as arms of the state even without explicit state 
involvement.52 The state has—in this case, implicitly—allocated the 
demand for force to the private police force. The private police rely 
on this underlying state authority to legitimize their actions. Third, 
private police may be private mercenaries fulfilling a private demand 
for force irrelevant to the establishment of security and order in 
society, and thereby beyond the scope of Bill of Rights protections.53 
 
 49. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 176 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Delegation, as 
it is used in this dissent, is arguably equivalent to this Note’s use of the term “allocation.” See 
supra Part I.A. 
 50. Joh, supra note 2, at 359–60 (“Whether it encourages by inaction, or discourages 
through legislation and public critique, the state is always implicated in the development of 
private policing.”). 
 51. See infra Part IV.A. 
 52. See infra Part IV.B. 
 53. See infra Part IV.C. 
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II.  COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE ROLE OF THE SOVEREIGN IN 
HISTORICAL ENGLAND 
To understand American Revolutionary conceptions of police 
and sovereignty, it is necessary to begin with the evolution of policing 
and sovereign power in medieval and colonial England.54 Even before 
the Norman invasion, communal policing derived legitimacy from 
both local representation and sovereignty in the form of royalty.55 As 
townships and commerce grew in complexity and size, medieval 
citizens increasingly recognized the sovereign both as the only 
legitimate source of force and as ultimately responsible for internal 
policing.56 
The evolution of historical English policing institutions supports 
several larger points that are crucial to a theoretical understanding of 
public versus private policing. Throughout English history, royalty 
fought to preserve and strengthen its monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force. As a consequence, the sovereign acquired responsibility for 
internal policing: maintaining the security and well-being of its 
citizenry. At the same time, English royalty never relied solely on 
public officers, but rather on a complex mix of public and private 
suppliers of force to fulfill policing needs. In part because of this 
mixed reliance, speaking in terms of public versus private policing 
before the 1800s has little meaning.57 
 
 54. See, e.g., LEONARD A. STEVERSON, POLICING IN AMERICA 4 (2008) (“A history of 
policing in England helps us understand policing practices in America, because the colonists 
adopted primarily English law enforcement strategies.”). 
 55. See infra notes 59, 64 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra notes 78, 82 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 579 
(“Most historical studies of public policing begin by noting the patchwork of private and quasi-
public measures that existed before . . . 1829 . . . .” (footnote omitted)). But see id. at 580 
(“[E]arly examples of private policing . . . are better classified as examples of community 
obligations, volunteer efforts, and vigilantism.”). 
  “Prior to the eighteenth century, if the word ‘police’ was used, reference was, in effect, 
being made to the broad social function of ‘policing’: ‘the general regulation or government, the 
morals or economy, of a city or country.’” JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 4 (quoting STANLEY H. 
PALMER, POLICE AND PROTEST IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND 1780–1850, at 69 (1988)). The use 
of “police” in reference to specific crime prevention corresponded with the rise of public police 
around 1800 in London. Id. at 4 (noting the first statutory use of “police” in the modern sense 
occurred in 1800 with reference to the Thames River Police); see also id. at 6 (describing the 
shift after 1829 from ad hoc watch forces and constables to uniformed, paid police forces). 
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A.  Policing by Arms of the State in Anglo-Saxon Communities 
Before the Norman Invasion 
Prior to 1066, Saxon kings exerted minimal direct control over 
internal policing; local communities policed themselves at that time.58 
The Saxon kings relied heavily on this local communal organization, 
responding to public demand for security by legitimizing these 
systems of localized community protection and effectively 
establishing arms of the state.59 Landless freemen banded together 
into tythings (groups of ten men) and elected a representative 
headborough or tythingman to gain the protection of the king’s law.60 
Over time, a more official and structured system evolved, 
reflecting a minor shift toward the public end of the public-private 
supply spectrum. Groups of ten tythings formed “hundreds,” and 
both hundreds and tythings “had definite police functions to 
perform.”61 Namely, these groups pursued criminals, held the 
prisoners captive until trial, and produced the detained criminals at 
trial.62 Tythingmen and hundredmen were both local, private citizens 
but also were, in some respects, de facto public officers for the king. 
Shire reeves (sheriffs) represented the most public end of this 
spectrum because they had the ability to “muster the posse comitatus, 
or whole available police force of the shire [essentially, every armed 
man in the tything], in case of emergency.”63 King Edgar (r. 959–975) 
consolidated and institutionalized this system, formalizing his role as 
“highest maintainer of the peace”64 and officially recognizing the 
state’s obligation to ensure, through some allocation of force, order 
and security in society. 
 
 58. STEVERSON, supra note 54, at 5. 
 59. For example, King Alfred the Great (r. 871–900) required resident landowners known 
as thanes “to produce the culprit or satisfy the claim” against his kinfolk. WILLIAM LAURISTON 
MELVILLE LEE, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND 3 (1901), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=laiMjUpwYWcC. 
 60. Id.; David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1195 (1999); see 
also STEVERSON, supra note 54, at 5; Joh, supra note 57, at 580 (describing the groups as 
tithings). 
 61. MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 4–5. 
 62. Id. at 5; Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1195. Fines were levied against the tything and the 
hundred, in turn, for their failures to carry out these responsibilities. MELVILLE LEE, supra note 
59, at 5. 
 63. MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 7–8. 
 64. Id. at 1 (“[This] ‘King’s Peace’ . . . guaranteed, or at least promised, to his subjects, a 
state of peace and security in return for the allegiance which he demanded from them.”). 
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B.  The State’s Responsibility as Allocator of Force after the Norman 
Invasion 
The invading Normans adopted the basic Saxon community 
system,65 enforcing it through a preemptive, compulsory bail called a 
frankpledge66 that anticipated the arrest of individuals.67 The Normans 
also established a constable position,68 which continued the shift 
toward a reliance on suppliers of force who were increasingly public 
in nature. William the Conqueror and his successors also maintained 
the Saxon tradition of issuing proclamations of “general peace 
orders” upon their accession to avoid lapses in the “King’s Peace” 
upon the former ruler’s death.69 Time and again, English sovereigns 
would each lay claim to the responsibility of peace maintenance and 
to the title of “champion of order,”70 thereby reinforcing the state’s 
obligatory role as allocator of force to ensure order and security 
throughout society. 
C.  A Shift Toward the Public End of the Public-Private Supply 
Spectrum During the Late Middle Ages 
The Statute of Winchester, enacted in 1285,71 formalized—at 
least idealistically if not practically—several institutions illustrative of 
the theory of sovereign power over police and the public-private 
policing dichotomy. The statute affirmed the frankpledge system72 
and officially established the constable office.73 Sheriffs and 
constables were royal officers with powers of inspection and general 
supervision, and they sometimes played the role of official mercenary 
 
 65. Id. at 14. 
 66. The “frankpledge signif[ied] the guarantee for peace maintenance demanded by the 
king from all free Englishmen, the essential properties of this responsibility being, that it should 
be local, and that it should be mutual.” Id. at 4. 
 67. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1196. 
 68. Id. at 1196; see also R.I. Mawby, Variations on a Theme: The Development of 
Professional Police in the British Isles and North America, in POLICING ACROSS THE WORLD, 
supra note 2, at 28, 29 (recognizing the increased use of the term constable after the Norman 
invasion). 
 69. MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 2 n.1. 
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. See id. at 24–25 (describing the statute as the foundation of the modern police 
structure). 
 72. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1196; see also MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 25 
(describing the statute as “the definite product of a long series of experiments all tending in the 
same direction”). 
 73. Joh, supra note 57, at 580; Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1196. 
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when the king employed them for political ends unconnected to peace 
maintenance.74 Sheriffs could also use posse comitatus to keep the 
peace.75 Night watchmen were appointed, on a rotating basis, for 
every city and borough.76 
In the late Middle Ages, the justice of the peace eventually 
superseded the role of sheriff.77 In 1328, Edward III (r. 1327–1377) 
considerably extended the scope of the justices’ powers by 
empowering them to examine and punish lawbreakers.78 By 1360 the 
Justices of the Peace Statute had formalized the justices’ policing 
role.79 The justices of the peace represented the culmination of a shift 
toward reliance on actors that fell somewhere between arms of the 
state and de facto official police for the maintenance of order and 
security. 
Another common phenomenon that persisted throughout the 
Middle Ages and into the fifteenth century was the reliance by the 
constable and sheriff on the support of their fellow citizens—a 
concept of mutual responsibility dating back to Saxon communities80 
that illustrates the complex interweaving of public and private 
suppliers of force. Like the ancient frankpledge, freemen of the 
fifteenth century “enter[ed] into a solemn obligation to keep the 
peace, a compact which . . . had its origin in the ancient oath of 
allegiance.”81 The oaths required of constables and freemen 
demonstrate “how a compromise was arrived at between the ancient 
system of frankpledge and the more modern plan of employing a 
professional class of peace officers, and how, by means of the 
combined action of police and public, domestic tranquility was 
assured.”82 
 
 74. MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 28. 
 75. Id. at 44–45. Posse comitatus, as in Saxon culture, involved the response of all presently 
available armed men in the community. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 76. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1196–97. The night watch was generally “responsible for 
reporting fires, raising the ‘hue and cry’ when crimes were committed, and arresting or detaining 
suspicious persons.” Joh, supra note 57, at 581. 
 77. See MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 45 (describing how the corruption of sheriffs led 
to their displacement by justices of the peace). 
 78. Id. at 46. 
 79. Id. at 48; Mawby, supra note 68, at 29 (placing the date of passage as 1361). 
 80. MELVILLE LEE, supra note 59, at 75–76. 
 81. Id. at 76. 
 82. Id. at 76–77. 
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D.  Precursor to the Modern “Private Police”: The Rise of Private 
Funding via Commercial Property Interests 
After a period of feeble monarchs, during which nobles ignored 
the king’s peace, Henry VII (r. 1485–1509) set out “to re-assert the 
personal ascendancy of the sovereign, especially with regard to the 
maintenance of the peace.”83 Reformation measures included 
remuneration for de facto official officer positions and reliance on 
private experts supplied by trade guilds or livery companies to police 
increasingly complex commercial transactions.84 
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain and 
America, volunteer groups using private funding complemented, 
supplemented, or supplanted the mandatory systems of community 
protection.85 In Britain, felons associations posted rewards to 
apprehend criminals, assisted their members in prosecuting criminals, 
and sometimes hired private patrols.86 Victims hired private thief-
takers to retrieve stolen property.87 
In colonial America, Boston established a night watch in 1636, 
and watchmen became commonplace throughout the colonies.88 
“Crime control administered by a centralized government did not 
exist, and responsibility for protection was thrust upon the people 
themselves.”89 The constable and the night watch eventually became 
prevalent in American cities and towns by the early nineteenth 
century.90 
 
 83. Id. at 82. 
 84. Id. at 85–86. Because the highly commercialized middle class found compulsory 
constable duties to be unprofitable and time consuming, the system “degenerated into a system 
of paid substitutes.” Joh, supra note 57, at 581. 
 85. See Joh, supra note 57, at 582–84 (describing variants of privately funded associations). 
 86. Id. at 582. Between 1750 and 1856, felons associations surged in popularity. Id.; see also 
Johnston, supra note 2, at 228 (estimating the number of felons associations to be between 750 
and 4000). A typical association had twenty to sixty members covering ten to twenty miles. 
JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 10. 
 87. Joh, supra note 57, at 583; Mawby, supra note 68, at 30. 
 88. Mawby, supra note 68, at 31 (quoting F.B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 59 
(1920)). 
 89. Joh, supra note 57, at 580. 
 90. Id. at 581. 
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III.  THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION 
The American Revolution provides an important link between 
the English policing tradition and the U.S. Supreme Court’s state 
action doctrine. Although the Revolution brought with it new 
theories on sovereignty, the American states remained responsible—
much like the English sovereigns before them—for the maintenance 
of order and security in society. The nineteenth century introduced 
both more official public police forces and more powerful private 
corporate entities that further highlighted the public-private 
distinction in policing and paved the way for the Court’s state action 
doctrine. 
A.  American Conceptions of Sovereignty and Police Power 
The American Revolution and subsequent Constitution rejected 
English royalty as a basis for sovereignty yet adopted very traditional 
English views of policing. Revolutionary thinkers permeated the 
constitutional debate with concerns about sovereign power and the 
maintenance of security and order. Competing theories argued that 
sovereign power either flowed from the people or from the individual 
states.91 Either way, sovereign power in the United States remained 
responsible for the allocation of force to ensure order and security in 
society. 
 
 91. Some argued that constitutional legitimacy flowed from the people of the United States 
as a whole. By the time of the Convention, for example, delegate James Wilson, who later 
became one of the first Supreme Court Justices, believed that sovereignty was naturally held by 
neither national nor state governments, but rather by the people. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of 
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8 n.27 (2002) (citing GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 530–31 (1969)). 
  Others, like James Madison, placed the Constitution’s legitimacy with the peoples of 
the individual states but conceded that this was a theoretical point with limited practical 
significance. Madison argued that the “[proposed government] is of a mixed nature,” “consisting 
of many coëqual sovereignties,” but he readily conceded that “the authorities of the general 
government and state governments all radiate from the people at large. The people is their 
common superior.” 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS, ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 94, 381, 332 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996) 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (remarks of James Madison). 
  Still others, like Thomas Jefferson, felt that understanding the Constitution as a 
compact among individual states was important to post-ratification constitutional law. 
Jefferson’s belief, according to Philip Bobbitt, that “the state was the creation of sovereign 
power, not the other way round,” theoretically founded Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1991). 
ENION IN FINAL2 11/6/2009  2:11:02 PM 
2009] PRIVATE POLICING 535 
The word police entered the American lexicon during the 
political debates of the 1770s and 1780s.92 Along with this word, the 
American Revolution’s reconceptualization of sovereignty imported 
English ideas of responsibility for peace and order.93 After 1776, the 
newly emergent theory of police “gave political voice to a conception 
of republican government . . . grounded in the older communitarian 
idiom of ‘peace and unitie’ or ‘safety and happiness’ but shaped by a 
developing consciousness of popular right.”94 Although the 
foundation of sovereign authority had shifted, the sovereign’s 
responsibility for security and order had not.95 
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voiced concerns over 
the continued police power of the states.96 For example, Roger 
Sherman of the Connecticut delegation offered two motions to 
recognize the states’ power of “internal police.”97 Jefferson, later 
writing from Monticello, would sarcastically query, “[c]an it be 
believed that under the jealousies prevailing against the General 
Government at the adoption of the Constitution, the States meant to 
surrender the authority of preserving order, of enforcing moral 
duties, and restraining vice, within their own territory?”98 Jefferson’s 
 
 92. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 55 (1993). 
 93. For example, in the Constitution’s Preamble, “domestic Tranquility” echoes the 
famous English jurist William Blackstone’s conception of police. Christopher Tomlins, The 
Supreme Sovereignty of the State: A Genealogy of Police in American Constitutional Law, from 
the Founding Era to Lochner, in POLICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 33, 35 (Markus D. Dubber 
& Mariana Valverde eds., 2008). 
 94. TOMLINS, supra note 92, at 58–59. 
 95. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 84 (2005) (“Government also meant, as it always 
had, policing others.”). 
 96. Article IV, section 4 implicitly protects state cognizance of internal police power by 
allowing the federal government to protect “against Domestic Violence” only upon 
“Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. During a 1908 
rebellion in Nevada, President Theodore Roosevelt refused to provide national troops to 
Nevada Governor John Sparks, citing Article IV, section 4 and noting that “[t]he State 
government does not appear to have made any serious effort to do its duty by the effective 
enforcement of its police functions.” 2 DAVID KEMPER WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1298 (1910) (emphasis 
added). 
 97. 1 WATSON, supra note 96, at 597; 2 id. at 1307. 
 98. 1 id. at 598 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), 
in THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 844, 844 (John P. Foley ed., 1900)). 
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comment is an appropriate definitional basis of what would become 
the states’ police power.99 
Nineteenth century case law on the states’ police power reflects 
both Revolutionary-era thinking about popular sovereignty and 
English traditions concerning sovereign responsibility for internal 
policing. State supreme courts, not surprisingly, advanced state police 
power theories that emphasized state sovereignty and responsibility 
for protecting the peace and welfare of their citizenry.100 For example, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that threats to the 
state may originate externally, necessitating a militaristic response, or 
“arise within the State, [for which] self-preservation requires their 
suppression . . . . by the exercise of the police power 
which . . . provides for the public welfare, and the protection of 
citizens against the violence and the fraudulent conduct of each 
other.”101 This police power links the old English notion of king’s 
peace to the American conception of popular sovereignty granted by 
the people to the states. Importantly, the police power doctrine 
described in these cases recognized that states, like English royalty of 
times past, had necessarily adopted responsibility for maintaining 
peace and order as part of their delegated sovereign responsibilities.102 
B.  Development of the Public-Private Distinction in Policing 
Increased reliance on the police power doctrine presaged and 
accompanied the rise of public police and the public-private police 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 85 (1851) (hesitating to “prescribe 
limits” but noting that “the police power [is] . . . vested in the legislature by the [Massachusetts] 
constitution”); Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149–50 (1854) (distinguishing 
“police power,” which protects property, from “general police power of the State, by which 
persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the 
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State”). The U.S. Supreme Court also discussed 
the states’ police power in the context of federalism. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 
U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 103 (1837) (“It is not only the right, but the bound[] and solemn duty of a 
state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general 
welfare . . . .”). 
 101. Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306, 316 (1894). 
 102. The police power doctrine extends beyond the responsibility and power of the state to 
maintain security and order in the traditional sense. Nor is the police power simply the power to 
create the police per se. Expansion of the police power concept paralleled the nineteenth 
century Jacksonian expansion of government power through canals, railroads, free schools, and 
liquor prohibition. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 80 (1995). 
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distinction in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.103 Modern, 
professional public suppliers of force, in the form of police 
departments, became the norm, whereas professional private 
suppliers of force, such as the Pinkertons,104 took advantage of both 
the public demand for security and order in the West and the private 
corporate demand to rein in labor unions. Finally, late twentieth 
century policing gave rise to private multinational organizations that 
may realistically replace the state as an allocator of force.105 
The inadequacy of the “loosely coordinated patchwork of public 
and private arrangements” for policing that characterized the early 
nineteenth century led to increasingly official public police forces.106 
In 1829, the English Metropolitan Police Act established a 
professional, tax-supported police force that was uniformed, quasi-
military, and separate from the courts.107 The state prohibited these 
full-time officers from supplementing their incomes with private 
payments on the side.108 The Metropolitan Police served as the 
primary modern policing model for England and America.109 
New York created the first modern American public police force 
in 1844,110 and other cities followed shortly thereafter.111 A national 
police force did not exist, perhaps because “[t]he individual states 
were not willing to turn over complete authority to the federal 
government, and they stringently guarded their rights to govern 
themselves.”112 Most states shifted toward uniformed, official police 
during the second half of the nineteenth century.113 
 
 103. See Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1225 (“[O]nly in the second half of the nineteenth 
century did a relatively clear dividing line emerge between public and private policing.”). 
 104. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 105. Les Johnston, Transnational Security Governance, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE 
GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 23, at 36, 38; see also infra note 140. 
 106. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1202. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1203. 
 109. Id. at 1202; see also Mawby, supra note 68, at 38 (suggesting that the New York police 
force was modeled after the London police). 
 110. Johnston, supra note 2, at 226; Mawby, supra note 68, at 38. Sklansky places the 
establishment of the New York police at 1845. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1207. 
 111. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1207; see also Mawby, supra note 68, at 38 (noting the 
establishment of public police in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, New Orleans, and Cincinnati). 
 112. Mawby, supra note 68, at 38 (quoting Beverly Sweatman & Adron Cross, The Police in 
the United States, 5 CRIM. JUST. INT’L 11, 11 (1989)). 
 113. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1210. 
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Before and after the Civil War, the American South, however, 
relied on both official and unofficial force to sustain security and 
order in a culture in which slavery was pervasive. Officials 
participating in slave patrols drew their authority from the 
perfunctory warrant procedures—which paralleled pre-Revolutionary 
general warrants114—provided by federal and state fugitive-slave 
laws.115 During Reconstruction, the Southern Black Codes meant that 
African Americans “fac[ed] continuing violence—sometimes overtly 
state-sanctioned, sometimes by ‘private’ mobs often led by state 
officials—and seizures of their property.”116 These patrols and mobs 
are examples of how both de facto official police and arms of the 
state, respectively, can answer societal demands for security and 
order in an unconstitutional, abusive manner.117 
Also during the nineteenth century, interstate corporations, 
particularly railroads, hired private police firms to avoid jurisdictional 
problems with local public police forces and to protect their property 
in the relatively lawless western United States.118 Such private police 
firms were quintessential arms of the state in the sense that, by 
allowing them to exist, the state could avoid spending excessive 
resources on official police to enforce order and security in those 
areas. Private police agencies, such as the Pinkertons,119 protected 
property (playing the role of private mercenary), but more 
significantly, combated labor-related violence for steel, coal, and 
manufacturing corporations after the Civil War120 (playing, in part, the 
role of arm of the state by answering a distinctly public demand for 
greater order and security than the state was willing to provide 
directly). Corporations used private police to verify employee 
 
 114. See generally TASLITZ, supra note 24, at 17–36 (detailing British use of and colonial 
objections to general warrants and writs of assistance). 
 115. Id. at 12. “For all practical purposes, patrols had nearly unlimited authority to search, 
seize, and exercise violence . . . .” Id. at 109. 
 116. Id. at 13. 
 117. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 246 (1985) (discussing how post-
Civil War “racial apartheid” used “ostensibly ‘private’ power,” making it “hard to accept with 
equanimity a rigid legal distinction between state and society”). 
 118. Joh, supra note 2, at 362–63. Sklansky distinguishes between “company police,” hired 
by corporations “to protect their own property and empowered as police officers by the state,” 
and “national private police agenc[ies]” such as the Pinkerton agency. Sklansky, supra note 60, 
at 1211. 
 119. Joh, supra note 2, at 363. Other similar private organizations include the Pennsylvania 
Cossacks (The Coal and Iron Police), Burns, and Brinks. JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 20; 
Johnston, supra note 2, at 228. 
 120. Joh, supra note 2, at 364. 
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integrity, undermine labor strikes, work as “scabs,” and guard 
property during labor unrest.121 
Congressional investigations on private policing soon followed 
the 1892 Homestead Riot,122 in which Pinkerton guards exchanged 
gunfire with striking steelworkers.123 Notably, the Senate voiced a 
concern that private police forces impugned state sovereignty: “use of 
private armed men is an assumption of the state’s authority by private 
citizens.”124 This critique assumed that the states were obligated to 
ensure order and security, but had failed to allocate force in a 
responsible manner thereby risking their very sovereignty.125 
The distinction between public and private policing took on new 
significance, but the practical effect of the Homestead hearings was 
limited.126 While Pinkerton’s agency transitioned into guarding banks 
and jewelry stores, other agencies quickly filled the need for private 
police to protect corporate property and disrupt labor strikes.127 The 
period from 1900 through 1920 became a “golden age” for such 
organizations.128 
Continued violence between unions and corporations, which was 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the Great Depression, led to additional 
incidents and hearings.129 In 1936, Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. 
investigated the use of private police in strikebreaking, but he found 
it difficult to distinguish between the functions of private police 
agencies and suppliers of public police.130 A local sheriff, for example, 
deputized scores of men at the behest of a manufacturing company 
 
 121. Id. at 362, 364. 
 122. Id. at 365–66; Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1214–15. 
 123. Joh, supra note 2, at 365–66; Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1214–15. Three workers and 
twelve guards were killed. Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1215. 
 124. Joh, supra note 2, at 366 (quoting S. REP. NO. 52-1280, at XV (1893)); see also The 
Homestead Case, 1 Pa. D. 785, 789 (1892) (“It is the duty of the state to protect every citizen 
within her borders . . . . When the state fails to do this it fails in its duty as sovereign . . . .”). 
 125. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1423, 1428 (1982) (“The attack [late in the nineteenth century] on the public/private 
distinction was the result of a widespread perception that so-called private institutions were 
acquiring coercive power that had formerly been reserved to governments.”). 
 126. Joh, supra note 2, at 367. 
 127. Id. at 368; Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1216. 
 128. Joh, supra note 2, at 368 & n.64 (noting that private organizations in this period 
“patrolled rail yards, served warrants, protected small businesses, and even captured Army 
deserters for the federal government”). 
 129. See id. at 369 (“No employer facing a labor crisis, it seemed, went without the aid of 
private police assistance.”). 
 130. Id.; Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1218. 
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anticipating a strike at its textile mills.131 This same manufacturing 
company used private police to stop and search every car on the 
area’s only paved highway.132 Perhaps because of this blending of 
private and public, the La Follette Committee sharply distinguished 
public and private police responsibilities: “[p]rivate police 
systems . . . are created to meet the economic needs and desires of 
private interests. . . . [and] cannot be viewed as agencies of law and 
order.”133 The Committee had recognized that these private police 
could legitimately operate in the private mercenaries model, 
responding to private economic needs and desires, but they should 
not be allowed to operate as arms of the state, enforcing order and 
security, without the imposition of additional restrictions and 
safeguards. 
Public hostility toward private police steadily declined through 
the mid-twentieth century.134 Although the number of private police 
stagnated during that time,135 it reversed course and increased 
dramatically through the 1960s and 1970s.136 Shifting public attitudes 
described private police as “complementary”137 forces that “do not 
usurp public authority, but provide much-needed aid to the public 
police.”138 This shift presaged a return to the arms of the state model: 
the allocation of private police forces to fulfill a public desire for 
order and security. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, private police forces have 
engaged in explicit partnerships with official police139 and have also 
resumed their nineteenth century role as national—and even 
transnational—security forces employed by corporations 
 
 131. Joh, supra note 2, at 369 (describing West Point Manufacturing Company). 
 132. Id. (citing ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 
STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, S. REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 1, at 45 (1939)). 
 133. Id. at 371 (quoting ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., ON PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, S. 
REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 2, at 2 (1939)). 
 134. Id. at 375. 
 135. Id.; see also Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1219–20 (arguing that much of the decline in 
private policing was “redeployment” into “the preventive patrol business”). Johnston cites 
several examples of the emerging guarding industry between World War I and World War II. 
See JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 19. 
 136. Joh, supra note 2, at 375; see also Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1221 (noting that this 
“rapid expansion” of private police continued through the end of the twentieth century 
although the growth of public police plateaued). 
 137. Joh, supra note 2, at 377 (quoting INST. FOR LOCAL SELF GOV’T, PRIVATE SECURITY 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 86 (1974)). 
 138. Id. (summarizing the findings of INST. FOR LOCAL SELF GOV’T, supra note 137, at 88). 
 139. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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worldwide.140 Definitional inconsistencies make tallying private police 
difficult, but, as of the early twenty-first century, there are far more 
private than public police in the United States.141 Yet, modern society 
often takes the role of private police for granted and few people 
question the “delegation of the sovereign power of the state to 
private hands” that permeated the debates of the Homestead 
investigations.142 Also taken for granted is the idea that public police 
must perform the role of the state, while private police perform some 
other function unrelated to the state. This public-private distinction, 
however, is belied by history. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PRIVATE POLICE AUTHORITY IN 
LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF THE STATE 
The state uses its derived authority to effectuate its police power 
responsibilities by legitimizing and sustaining its monopoly on the 
allocation of legitimate force. The state may allocate force, explicitly 
or implicitly, to any mix of official police and arms of the state.143 The 
state’s social contract with its citizens prevents it from renouncing its 
responsibility to provide security and order in society.144 Therefore, 
this Note argues that both official police and arms of the state should 
be constitutionally liable for their actions.145 
 
 140. A few large companies dominate the transnational private security industry, focusing 
on general security and specialized services such as “airline security, drugs-testing, surveillance, 
executive protection, facility hardening and the monitoring of populations engaged in travelling, 
tourism and migration.” Johnston, supra note 105, at 36–38; see also supra note 3. 
 141. Professor Ric Simmons estimates that private police spending is double public police 
spending. Simmons, supra note 3, at 920–21 & nn.34–38. Of note, The Economist magazine 
placed the ratio of private security to public law enforcement in the United States at three-to-
one in 1997. Policing for Profit: Welcome to the New World of Private Security, ECONOMIST, 
Apr. 19, 1997, at 21. In 2008, the United States Department of Labor counted over one million 
security guards and private detectives, but only 633,710 police and sheriff’s patrol officers with 
another 104,480 public detectives and criminal investigators. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NO. 09-0457, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, 2008, tbl.1 
(2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf. 
 142. Joh, supra note 2, at 385 (quoting William T. Martin, Editorial, Industrial Police Stir 
Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1931, at 58); see also Clifford Shearing, Reflections on the 
Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE 
GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 23, at 11, 11 (lamenting scholars’ “refusal to 
acknowledge the existence of . . . ‘private governments’”); Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1166–68 
(“[L]egal scholars have tended to ignore private security.”). 
 143. See supra Table 1: Models of Policing Authority. 
 144. See supra Part I.A. 
 145. See supra Part I.C. 
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The Supreme Court, in contrast, would characterize this 
constitutional liability under its state action doctrine by distinguishing 
public and private actions. In brief, the state action doctrine holds 
that private actions remain unrestricted by the Constitution unless the 
state is intimately involved in the action in question.146 This Note 
seeks to reconceptualize this doctrine147 and move beyond the public-
private state action debate148 by defining action in terms of function. 
The functional argument is that an actor fulfilling a public demand for 
force is constitutionally liable, whereas an actor fulfilling a private 
demand for force is not. Support for this definition of action can be 
found by contrasting the facts and holdings of what have been 
traditionally considered state action cases. 
The three categories of private police authority highlighted in 
Part I.C guide the determination of when the Bill of Rights should 
apply to private police actions. First, constitutional restrictions should 
apply to de facto official police who have become public suppliers by 
responding to a public demand for force. Second, constitutional 
restrictions should apply to arms of the state. Third, constitutional 
restrictions should not apply to private mercenaries. Put simply, any 
actor whose function it is to answer to a public demand for security 
and order should be constitutionally liable for his actions. This 
scheme’s largest departure from traditional state action analysis is in 
the arms of the state category, in which an ostensibly private actor 
fulfills a public demand for force. 
 
 146. See, e.g., Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 508. 
 147. Professor Laurence Tribe and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky offer two critical 
reconceptualizations of state action doctrine. See TRIBE, supra note 117, at 246–66 (suggesting 
that state action cases can be interpreted by (1) examining the closeness of the tie between the 
state and the actor who committed the alleged constitutional violation and (2) examining the 
substantive law involved); Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 550 (“The effect of discarding the 
concept of state action is that the Constitution would be viewed as a code of social morals, not 
just of government conduct, bestowing individual rights that no entity, public or private, could 
infringe without a compelling justification.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (“It is fair to 
say that ‘our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not 
been a model of consistency.’” (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 
(1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting))); Sklansky, supra note 60, at 1225, 1246 & n.451 (echoing 
Charles Black’s critique that the state action doctrine is a “conceptual disaster area” and 
indentifying other critiques (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—
Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 
95 (1967))). 
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A.  Private Police as De Facto Official Police (Public Demand, Public 
Supply) 
In the first category of private police authority, private police 
have become agents of the state, effectively de facto official police. 
“[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the state with 
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or 
instrumentalities of the state and subject to its constitutional 
limitations.”149 Two related Supreme Court doctrines recognize this 
concept: the under color of law doctrine and the state action 
doctrine.150 
The under color of law doctrine originates in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
which provides for civil litigation when a “person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State . . . [deprives any person] of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws.”151 Even when an actor is not a 
state officer, he is liable under the Constitution if he willfully 
participates jointly with the state or with state agents.152 “[A] person 
acts under color of state law only when exercising power ‘possessed 
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer 
is clothed with the authority of state law.’”153 
Similarly, a finding of state action will bring the actor under 
constitutional limitations. 
If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act 
under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that he 
might have taken that same action had he acted in a purely private 
capacity or that the particular action which he took was not 
authorized by state law.154 
Here, both the state action doctrine and the under color of law 
doctrine reflect the notion that the individual possessing state 
authority transforms into an official state actor—a public supplier of 
force. 
 
 149. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). 
 150. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982) (noting that the two 
doctrines are “obviously related” and “until recently this Court did not distinguish between the 
two requirements at all”). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 152. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). 
 153. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 
 154. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964). 
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Under this test, the “attributable to the state” concept is much 
broader than the “possessed of state authority” concept, as 
demonstrated by Justice White’s long list of various tests and 
factors.163 Tests like the public function test164 or the state compulsion 
test165 reflect situations in which private actors function as arms of the 
state. The next subsection focuses on this type of situation. 
B.  Private Police Reliance on Implicit Underlying State Authority: 
Arms of the State (Public Demand, Private Supply) 
This Note contends that, under two related theories, a private 
actor may be answerable for violations of constitutional rights when 
he supplies force related to a societal demand for security and order. 
Under an absolute arm of the state theory, an initial action may 
violate the victim’s constitutional rights regardless of any subsequent, 
explicit state legal intervention. The public function test described in 
Lugar and exemplified by both Marsh v. Alabama166 and Terry v. 
Adams167 provides an apt analogy to this absolute theory.168 Under a 
qualified arm of the state theory, it is a subsequent state intervention 
or sanction following the initial action that is considered the true 
constitutional violation that may make a private actor liable. This 
theory of liability is analogous to the state compulsion test described 
in Lugar.169 Admittedly, the distinction between the absolute arm of 
the state theory and the qualified arm of the state theory is not a 
bright line, but, under either theory, a private actor should fall under 
the arm of the state model. 
1. Absolute Arm of the State Theory.  Whenever a private 
supplier acts as an arm of the state by fulfilling a public demand for 
order and security, that private supplier should be held to 
constitutional standards, regardless of whether the state subsequently 
 
 163. Id. at 939. 
 164. See id. (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946)); Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion) (“For a state to permit such a duplication of 
its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.”). 
 165. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 
(1970)); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 151–52 (“[A] State must not . . . act to compel or encourage racial 
segregation.”). 
 166. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 167. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 168. See supra note 164. 
 169. See supra note 165. 
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intervenes. This initial wrongdoing by the private actor is itself a 
constitutional violation because the private actor, functioning as an 
absolute arm of the state, provides a public service for which the state 
retains ultimate responsibility. 
The Court’s use of the public function test in Marsh v. Alabama 
illustrates the parallels between that test and this Note’s absolute arm 
of the state theory. A corporation owned and rented out the 
buildings, owned the paved street and sidewalk, and paid a deputy 
sheriff to police the town of Chickasaw, Alabama.170 The deputy 
sheriff arrested Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness, for distributing religious 
literature on the sidewalk in violation of the corporation’s policy.171 
The Marsh opinion does not depend on this arrest per se.172 Instead, 
the Court’s opinion primarily concerns the private actions and 
constitutional liability of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, which, 
while engaging in classic private policing reminiscent of that of 
company police or the nineteenth-century Pinkertons,173 violated 
Marsh’s First Amendment rights.174 
In Marsh, the state had allocated the provision of certain public 
trust concerns—namely public common areas, highways, and 
security—to a private corporation. Justice Black analogized the 
company town to “bridges, ferries, turnpikes and 
railroads . . . [whose] operation is essentially a public function.”175 
Justice Black’s examples of public functions are each based in the 
public trust and security responsibilities of the state.176 These services 
satisfy public demands, and they should fall under the auspices of 
 
 170. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502–03. 
 171. Id. at 503. 
 172. See id. at 511 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he technical distinctions on which a 
finding of ‘trespass’ so often depends are too tenuous to control decision [sic] regarding the 
scope of the vital liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
  If Gulf Shipbuilding had merely excluded Marsh from the town by a private show of 
force, the outcome would likely have been the same; Justice Black’s majority opinion largely 
focuses on the application of the First Amendment to the company town. See, e.g., id. at 509 
(majority opinion) (“[W]e balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those 
of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion . . . .”). 
 173. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
 174. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. 
 175. Id. 
 176. In Justice Black’s highway analogy, “even had there been no express franchise but 
mere acquiescence by the State in the corporation's use of its property as a segment of the four-
lane highway, operation of all the highway, including the segment owned by the corporation, 
would still have been performance of a public function and discrimination would certainly have 
been illegal.” Id. at 507 (footnote omitted). 
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state regulation and constitutional restrictions whether the ultimate 
supplier is public or private. 
Terry v. Adams provides another example of a public function—
elections—that can be reconceptualized under the absolute arm of 
the state theory. A plurality of the Supreme Court applied 
constitutional restrictions to a privately run county primary that, in 
practical terms, determined the subsequent county elections.177 By 
describing the private Jaybird Association as “an integral part . . . of 
the elective process,” the Court effectively found the association to be 
an arm of the state.178 The Jaybird Association therefore incurred 
constitutional liability for its violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.179 
The analysis of the Terry Court parallels this Note’s absolute 
theory because the Court focuses on the immediate violation by the 
private actor. Even though, as Justice Frankfurter noted in his 
concurrence, “formal State action, either by way of legislative 
recognition or official authorization, is wholly wanting,”180 the 
plurality needed to ensure that Texas could not “cast[] its electoral 
process in a form which permits a private organization to practice 
racial discrimination in the election.”181 Both Justice Black’s plurality 
opinion and Justice Clark’s concurrence recognized that elections, 
like the state’s police power responsibilities, are an essential state 
characteristic.182 Thus, even when supplied by private organizations, 
the provision of elections, like the provision of force, necessarily 
answers to a societal demand. 
Later Court opinions expound upon the concept of a public 
function, relating it to the sovereign’s police power responsibilities. 
For example, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co.,183 summarized Marsh and its brethren as 
teaching that private entities may perform public functions (that is, 
 
 177. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (plurality opinion) (“The only election 
that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years has been that held by the 
Jaybirds . . . .”). 
 178. Id. at 469. 
 179. Id. at 470. 
 180. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 181. Id. at 466 (plurality opinion) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)). 
 182. See id. at 468–69 (recognizing in the Fifteenth Amendment a public demand in “any 
election in which the public issues are decided or public officials selected,” regardless of the 
scope of the electorate or the nature of the organization running the election); id. at 484 (Clark, 
J., concurring) (emphasizing how the Jaybird Association exerted state power and effectively 
acquired “those attributes of government which draw the Constitution’s safeguards into play”). 
 183. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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fulfill a public demand) when the state delegates to the private entity 
“some power . . . which is traditionally associated with sovereignty.”184 
One example is the publicly accessible park, which, as the Court 
recognized in Evans v. Newton,185 may not segregate even if run by a 
private entity. The Court reasoned that the private entity supplied the 
community with a “municipal” service.186 This municipal service 
satisfied a public demand because oversight of public trust lands is a 
quintessential, traditional government responsibility similar to the 
government’s responsibility for the police power. 
2. Qualified Arm of the State Theory.  Often, initial private 
security action precedes later public action, usually in the form of an 
arrest or explicit sanction of the initial action. Under the qualified 
private supply theory, the subsequent intervening action of the state 
is what brings the antecedent action of the private supplier of force 
under constitutional scrutiny. Courts have used a similar test—the 
state compulsion test—to identify when a state compels or 
encourages unconstitutional actions.187 
For example, in People v. Zelinski,188 department store security 
detained a woman for suspected shoplifting and found heroin while 
searching her purse and pill vial.189 Police charged the suspected 
shoplifter with drug possession.190 The California Supreme Court 
excluded the drug evidence obtained through the search because “[i]n 
arresting the offender, the store employees were utilizing the coercive 
power of the state to further a state interest.”191 The security guards’ 
actions went beyond “the vindication of the merchant’s private 
interests [that is, the return of the stolen merchandise].”192 In other 
words, the store security fulfilled a public demand for order and 
security beyond the store’s private interests. The Zelinski opinion 
implied that the security guards could have conducted an 
unreasonable search to merely recover the stolen merchandise 
 
 184. Id. at 352–53. 
 185. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 186. Id. at 301. 
 187. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 188. People v. Zelinski, 594 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1979) (en banc). 
 189. Id. at 1002. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1006. 
 192. Id. 
ENION IN FINAL2 11/6/2009  2:11:02 PM 
2009] PRIVATE POLICING 549 
without being constitutionally liable.193 Because it was the subsequent 
arrest that brought constitutional scrutiny, the Zelinski opinion 
rejects an absolute arm of the state theory but affirms the qualified 
arm of the state theory.194 
The Supreme Court, often hesitant to ascribe constitutional 
liability to the initial private action directly,195 will instead resort to a 
particularly attenuated under color of law argument. For example, in 
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,196 Kress, a private restaurant, refused to 
serve a white woman in the company of six young black students; she 
was then arrested for vagrancy upon leaving the restaurant.197 Justice 
Harlan’s opinion held that, regardless of actual police involvement,198 
Ms. Adickes “would show an abridgement of her equal protection 
right, if she proves that Kress refused her service because of a state-
enforced custom of segregating the races in public restaurants.”199 
Accordingly, the Kress restaurant was playing the role of arm of the 
state by allegedly enforcing the state’s discriminatory customs. 
Other segregation cases similarly find constitutional liability only 
when a private actor turns to explicit state authority.200 In 
 
 193. See id. (noting that “[h]ad the security guards sought only the vindication of the 
merchant's private interests they would have simply exercised self-help and demanded the 
return of the stolen merchandise”). 
 194. Analogizing to Zelinski, a New York state court held that an unconstitutional search of 
an employee by private hotel security required the suppression of evidence in a criminal larceny 
case. People v. Stormer, 518 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352–53 (Warren County Ct. 1987). Hotel security 
officers went beyond the hotel’s “private interests” (acquiring the stolen money and firing the 
employee), and were instead “promoting society’s interest and, as such, the safeguards provided 
by the Fourth Amendment were activated.” Id at 353. But see Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465, 475 (1921) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is only applicable to government action); 
United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891, 892–94 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusing to apply Fourth 
Amendment protections to a search of two alleged counterfeiters conducted by Disney World 
security that led to the defendants’ arrest and prosecution); Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 
N.E.2d 1036, 1041–42 (Mass. 1982) (distinguishing a public officer’s investigatory duties from his 
duties as a private security officer). 
 195. See, e.g., supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
 196. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
 197. Id. at 146–47. 
 198. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan found material issues of fact concerning a 
possible conspiracy between the policeman and the restaurant owner. See id. at 153 (stating that 
the respondent restaurant “failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine 
issue of fact”). 
 199. Id. at 171. 
 200. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (holding that 
the peremptory challenge system had “its source in state authority,” which prevented a private 
litigant from racially excluding jurors); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716–
17 (1961) (finding the city parking authority liable for discriminatory actions of its lessee). 
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Peterson v. City of Greenville,201 black children were convicted of 
violating a state trespass statute after another Kress restaurant 
manager “asked them to leave because integrated service was 
‘contrary to local customs’ of segregation at lunch counters and in 
violation of [a] Greenville City ordinance.”202 Crucial to the Court’s 
reasoning was the concept that “[w]hen the State has commanded a 
particular result, it . . . ‘to a significant extent’ has ‘become involved’ 
in it, and, in fact, has removed that decision from the sphere of 
private choice.”203 In Shelley v. Kraemer,204 the Supreme Court held 
that private, voluntary, racially restrictive covenants did not 
themselves violate the Fourteenth Amendment.205 The Court, 
however, distinguished the covenants themselves from court 
enforcement of those agreements, holding such enforcement to be 
unconstitutional.206 
Issues of racial discrimination and segregation have become, in 
essence, part of the police power responsibility for which the state 
must allocate its resources accordingly. That is not to say that search 
and seizure is not part of the general police power,207 but rather that 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments bring the 
issues of slavery, segregation, and discrimination to the forefront of 
state and federal security and welfare concerns. Adickes, Peterson, 
and Shelley each involve subsequent state action—namely, arrest or 
sanction—that exemplifies the qualified nature of the private actor as 
an arm of the state. 
 
 201. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
 202. Id. at 245–46. 
 203. Id. at 248. 
 204. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley is a unique and problematic case that, 
according to Dean Chemerinsky, has led to “a set of precedents that cannot possibly be 
reconciled,” Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 526, because it leads to the sweeping declaration 
that judicial action equals state action, id. at 525. But Shelley is not concerned with all court 
action; it is specifically focused on racial discrimination—a police power concern. See Henry J. 
Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1290, 1295 
(1982) (“I cannot escape the conclusion that it was Missouri’s maintenance of a rule of common 
law permitting the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, not the action of its courts in 
enforcing that rule, that was the unconstitutional state action in Shelley.”). 
 205. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13. 
 206. Id. at 13–14, 23. 
 207. For example, private carrier searches of packages for contraband may fall under the 
state’s general police power responsibility and therefore require closer examination under this 
Note’s theory that the private carriers may be acting as qualified arms of the state. But see 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111–12, 126 (1984) (“[By searching a package] the 
federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not 
already been frustrated as the result of [a prior private carrier search of the package].”). 
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C.  Private Police Outside the Scope of State Interests: Private 
Mercenaries (Private Demand, Private Supply) 
The third model of private police authority—private 
mercenaries—by definition falls outside the scope of state police 
power concerns. Private mercenaries, who answer private demand for 
force with private supply of force, therefore do not invoke 
constitutional restrictions.208 Although private demand can at times be 
difficult to distinguish from public communal demand for order and 
security,209 the La Follette Committee’s definition is apt: private 
demand reflects the “economic needs and desires of private interests” 
separate from broader community interests in security.210 Private 
mercenaries answer to what Professor Elizabeth Joh describes as a 
“client-driven mandate.”211 
Courts typically place individual or corporate needs outside the 
scope of traditional state police power responsibilities. Within this 
Note’s framework, these needs are private demands, in contrast to the 
public demand for order and security. For example, Medicare funding 
of private nursing homes, although a legitimate state interest, falls 
outside the scope of functions that are “traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the State.”212 In his dissent to Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,213 
Justice Stevens argued that the state authorized a warehouseman’s 
enforcement of a lien via private sale of storage goods.214 Justice 
Rehnquist, specifically rejecting Justice Stevens’s contention,215 cited 
elections, Marsh, education, fire, police, tax, and antidiscrimination as 
examples of state administered functions “with a greater degree of 
exclusivity by States”216 than this private property concern, which he 
 
 208. Note that, as a separate matter, if the state were to act as an official mercenary, 
supplying force in response to a private demand, then the state would still be held to 
constitutional limitations because the state is a public actor. See supra Parts I.C and IV.A. 
 209. See supra Part I.B. 
 210. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 211. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 
62 (2004). 
 212. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345, 456–57 (1974)). 
 213. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
 214. Id. at 169–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 215. See id. at 160 n.9 (majority opinion) (“[T]his case does not involve state authorization 
of private breach of the peace.”). 
 216. Id. at 163. 
ENION IN FINAL 2.DOC 11/6/2009  2:11:02 PM 
552 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:519 
consequently placed outside the scope of these traditional public 
demands.217 
Private shopping centers provide an interesting example of the 
often difficult distinction between public and private demand. 
Initially, the Supreme Court concluded in Amalgamated Food 
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza218 that “[t]he shopping center 
here is clearly the functional equivalent of the business district of 
Chickasaw involved in Marsh.”219 Logan Valley represents a view of 
the private shopping mall as equivalent to a community, necessarily 
supplying force in response to a communal need for order and 
security. Four years later, the Court backed away from that view, 
however, finding in the shopping mall “no comparable assumption or 
exercise of municipal functions or power.”220 Recognizing the shift in 
description, the Court officially overruled Logan Valley in its 1976 
Hudgens v. NLRB221 opinion, while reaffirming that “[i]f a large self-
contained shopping center is the functional equivalent of a 
municipality . . . then the First and Fourteenth Amendments [would 
apply].”222 Hudgens splits the difference along the public-private 
demand continuum: according to the Court, a private shopping 
mall—like a small business—focuses only on private corporate 
economic needs whereas a larger shopping mall may need to function 
as an arm of the state to provide a necessary level of order and 
security to its customers. The private nature of the shopping mall 
does not constitute an impediment to the imposition of constitutional 
liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout English and American history, the distinction 
between public and private policing has been blurred. The system of 
governance embodied in the U.S. Constitution maintains the 
traditional English concept that the sovereign retains an obligation 
and responsibility to ensure order and security in society. Through its 
derived authority, the state holds a monopoly on the allocation of 
 
 217. See id. at 160 n.10. 
 218. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 
(1968). 
 219. Id. at 318. 
 220. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972). 
 221. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
 222. Id. at 520. 
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legitimate force. Constitutional restrictions, in turn, should apply to 
the state’s explicit or implicit allocation of force through either public 
or private supply. The Bill of Rights, as interpreted through the state 
action doctrine, imposes restrictions on how the state may fulfill its 
obligation and responsibility to ensure security and order in society. 
These restrictions should follow function over form: both official 
police and private police functioning as arms of the state should be 
held to constitutional standards because they have been legitimized, 
directly or indirectly, by the state, to fulfill a public demand for order 
and security. In contrast, private mercenaries who fulfill merely a 
private demand for force unrelated to communal order and security 
do not fall within the purview of the Bill of Rights. An examination of 
classic state action doctrine case law demonstrates that, in most cases, 
courts indeed look to function over form. Determining exactly when a 
private police force has moved beyond fulfilling mere private 
demands for force and instead has taken on the state’s responsibility 
for order and security will continue to be a difficult line to draw. 
